Clinical Ethics in Oxford

In June, I had the privilege of presenting at the International Conference on Clinical Ethics Consultation (ICCEC) in Oxford, UK. The conference brings together clinicians, philosophers, social workers, and others who work in clinical ethics to discuss new developments in the field, ideas for improving ethics services, and obstacles to providing excellent health care all over the world. 

I led a panel discussion called "Moral Expertise from International Perspectives," alongside Jennifer Flynn from St. John's Canada and Salla Saxén from Tampere, Finland.

My contribution to the panel was an attempt to demythologize the concept of moral expertise. Many scholars worry that moral expertise implies special access to a metaphysical realm, a claim to decisional authority that trumps even expert judgment in other fields, or to make completely unbiased judgments.

However, theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that no kind of expertise has these  implications and, thus, there is no reason to think moral expertise should imply them. Whether moral expertise actually exists or is widely achievable are different questions. But if moral expertise is possible, there are reasons to think it would look like other types of expertise.